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This paper shows a signicant and causal positive relationship between good
institutions and sustainability. Sustainability is measured by the indicator
of adjusted net saving (ANS) and institutional quality by an average of
six dimensions of governance. An instrumental variable is used to rule out
reverse causality. Conducting the regression accordingly on the national
savings rate yields a much weaker and smaller eect. This suggests that the
saving of non-physical capital is in
uenced more strongly by institutional
quality than that of physical capital. This further supports the explanation
of the `resource curse' by institutions.
Keywords: sustainable development, adjusted net saving, genuine saving,
institutions, resource curse, settler mortality
1Preliminary version, please do not cite without permission.
2Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) & University of Hamburg1 Introduction
The decision concerning the depletion rate of a natural resource or the har-
vesting rate of a renewable resource is based on long-term planning, and
maximizing long-term utility may involve waiting e.g. stocks are re-grown
or until resource prices reach a certain level. Thus, it is crucial for these
decisions that an individual can rely on the institutions around to persist.
The individual must be able to rely on the fact that his rights are also go-
ing to be enforced in the future. Institutions should therefore guarantee a
stable framework in which the individual can decide on (sustainable) de-
pletion rates. This example illustrates one way in which institutions may
in
uence saving decisions not only for physical capital but also for natural
capital. Following this motivation, the paper explores the impact of insti-
tutional quality on sustainable development in a cross-country framework.
The goal of the paper is to quantify the eect that institutional quality has
on adjusted net saving (hereafter ANS), a macroeconomic indicator for an
economy's sustainability. This eect is shown to be positive, statistically
and economically signicant and robust to various tests. An instrumental
variable is used to establish a one-direction impact from institutions to sus-
tainability, i.e. to rule out reverse causality.
Sustainable development is dened as non-declining human welfare over
time.3 On national level, this implies that as long as the average indi-
vidual is not becoming worse o, a country is developing in a sustainable
way. Since the stock of natural resources and their depletion rates play a
vital role for uture returns, welfare and wealth of a country, it is essential to
include these other forms of assets into the concept of wealth and national
3Pearce, Markandya & Barbier (1989)
1accounting.4 The World Bank (1997) has introduced a measure of wealth
that includes natural and intangible capital in addition to the `traditional'
physical capital. If capital is dened in a suciently broad way - i.e. if it
includes everything that aects the well-being of individuals - changes in
capital can be interpreted as changes in welfare.
Following the constant capital rule, a country develops sustainably if capi-
tal per capita is non-declining over time,5 independent of the initial capital
stock. This implies that a modied savings rule can be used to determine if
a country is developing in a potentially sustainable way: If capital is dened
broadly and includes natural and intangible capital in addition to physical
capital, its change - saving or dis-saving of the entire asset base - indicates if
an economy is developing sustainably. Adjusted net saving (hereafter ANS)
re
ects this change by subtracting (dis)saving of natural capital from and
adding investment in human capital to the savings rate of physical capital.
Since only the change in total capital is considered, ANS follows the concept
of weak sustainability.6
Institutions are thought of as written and unwritten rules and norms that
organize the life of individuals and in this way aect their welfare.7 They
provide the framework in which interactions in an economy take place.8
One of the fundamental problems for measuring the impact of institutions
is the question of causality: Although there is a positive correlation between
institutional quality and ANS, the direction of the causality is not clear.
4Atkinson, Hamilton & Pearce (1997)
5E.g. in Pearce & Atkinson (1992).
6ANS can be seen as a lower bound: If the rate is negative, development is not sus-
tainable following weak sustainability, but also not sustainable in the concept of strong
sustainability (Clemens & Hamilton (1999)).
7Glaeser, Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer (2004)
8World Bank (2002)
2Therefore, in order to assess the impact of institutions on sustainability, an
exogenous factor has to be found, which can be used as an instrument for
institutions but at the same time is not aected by the ANS level. With
this variable, it would be possible to measure the eect avoiding problems
of endogeneity.
Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) use mortality rates European settlers
faced in colonies at the time of settlement as an instrument for institutional
quality today. Their approach is based on the assumption that the mortality
rates settlers faced in the colonies were crucial for the type of institutions
they set up: When they settled themselves, they brought with them their
institutions, when they did not, they built institutions that allowed to ex-
ploit the local population. In places that provided a healthy environment
for settlers, they replicated European institutions, i.e. copies of home in-
stitutions with well-enforced property rights were established. Those early
institutions were highly persistent even after independence of the respective
country and in this way, settler mortality rates a hundred years ago shaped
current institutions. From today's perspective, current institutions were de-
termined by early institutions; early institutions in turn were in
uenced by
European settlement and the settlement was aected by settler mortality.9
This approach is adopted and modied in this paper.
Atkinson & Hamilton (2003) suggest that a country's institutions may play
an important role for an economy's sustainability, particularly in resource-
abundant countries. The importance of institutions and especially of secure
property rights for saving decisions is outlined for example in Acemoglu
9Acemoglu et al. (2001)
3et al. (2001). The so-called resource curse,10 which has been explained
among other things by the quality of institutions,11 makes it interesting to
investigate how institutional quality aects ANS e.g. by determining the
ability to invest natural resource rents in long-lasting investments. There-
fore, the paper rst aims to answer if institutional quality has an impact on
ANS rates.
The public good character of many parts of natural and intangible capital
is another reason why institutions could be particularly important for the
dierence between ANS and the saving of physical capital (net national sav-
ing). Therefore, in a second step it is tested if there is a dierence between
the impact institutions have on ANS and their impact on saving of physical
capital.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: First the estimation
method is presented and the data sets are introduced. This is followed by
the results of the estimation. The paper then presents various checks for the
robustness of the results and ends with a brief conclusion.
10Many resource-abundant countries suer from low rates of economic growth.
11E.g. Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2002)
42 The Impact of Institutions on Sustainability
2.1 Estimation Method
The aim of the paper is to estimate the impact of institutional quality on
ANS rates. This is captured by the following OLS regression:
ANSi =  + Ri + X0
i
 + i (1)
where ANSi is the rate of adjusted net saving in country i, Ri stands for in-
stitutional quality in country i, Xi is a vector of covariates and i is an error
term. However, as argued in the introduction, there are reasons to suspect
reverse causality and measurement error and therefore an OLS estimation of
institutions on ANS rates leads to biased estimates for the coecients. Con-
sequently, institutional quality is instrumented and a 2-stage-least-square
regression of institutional quality on ANS is conducted.
In the rst stage (equation 2), the instrument (Mi) is regressed on the
endogenous variable institutional quality (Ri). A high R2 shows a close
correlation between the instrument and current institutions. The basic IV
estimation does not include any control variables and therefore, the rst
stage shows how much of the variation in current institutions can be ex-
plained by the instrument. The equation for the rst stage estimation is
thus:
Ri =  + logMi + X0
i + i (2)
where Ri is the quality of institutions in country i, Mi is the instrument for
institutional quality in country i, Xi is a vector of covariates that aect all
variables (none in basic specication) and i is an error term.
5In the second stage (equation 3), ANS is regressed on the tted values from
the rst stage estimation. This yields the impact of institutions on sustain-
ability. The exclusion restriction is that M does not in
uence equation 3, i.e.
that the instrument has no in
uence on current savings decisions, other than
its eect through institutions. The equation for the second stage estimation
is thus:
ANSi =  +  ^ Ri + X0
i
 + i (3)
where ANSi is the rate of adjusted net saving in country i, ^ Ri stands for
the tted values from the rst stage estimation for country i, Xi is a vector
of covariates that aect all variables (none in basic specication) and i is
an error term.
2.2 Data
Sustainable development is measured by ANS rates that are published annu-
ally by the World Bank.12 The rates are available for the period 1970-2006,
expressed as a percentage of GNI and collected for 138 countries.13
To measure institutional quality (Ri from equation 2), data from Kaufmann,
Kraay & Mastruzzi (2008) is used. The authors combine a large number of
indicators to six measures of governance: voice and accountability, political
stability, government eectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control
of corruption. These serve as a measure for current institutional quality in
the following analysis. The indicators range from about -2.5 to 2.5, where
12World Bank (2008)
13In the estimation, ANS rates excluding PM10 damage are used. This allows to keep
two more observations compared to ANS rates including PM10 rates.
6a higher value means better outcomes and were rescaled to range from 1 to
10. Governance indicators were measured for 212 countries annually for the
period 1996-2007.
The six governance indicators are highly correlated and cannot be used
jointly in a regression for reasons of multicollinearity. Since they all mea-
sure parts of underlying true institutions, one should not focus on only one
of them in this context. Therefore, an unweighted average of the six indica-
tors is used to measure a country's institutional quality.14
For the years 1996-2006 data is available for both variables, ANS and in-
stitutional quality. Therefore, this period is considered in the following
estimation. Both variables show relatively little variation over time.
As an instrument for institutional quality, mortality estimates from Ace-
moglu et al. (2001) are used. Settler mortality displays replacement rates
of settlers in the individual colonies.15 The authors state that settlers were
well informed about expected mortality rates in the colonies, although they
could not control the diseases. Thus, the expected mortality rates in
uenced
their decision to settle.
Obviously, the time-less nature of the instrument does not allow for the
treatment of variations over time. But since one of the main characteris-
tics of institutions is that they change only gradually over time16 and only
persistently negative ANS rates indicate non-sustainable development,17 in-
14Additionally, all regressions were conducted for each indicator separately. Results of
these estimations can be found in the appendix (table 9).
15Acemoglu et al. (2001) take data for mortality rates in the colonies compiled by Phillip
Curtin.
16Glaeser et al. (2004)
17Asheim (1994), cited in Atkinson et al. (1997)
7stitutional quality and ANS rates are both long-term concepts. Therefore,
averages of both variables were taken over the period 1996-2006. This should
yield stable results that are not driven by a particular year.
Since settler mortality is calculated only for countries with colonial experi-
ence, the sample is reduced to 64 countries. Two more observations get lost
because these countries lack ANS data. To make sure this reduction to 62
countries does not lead to a selection bias, for ANS and institutional quality
descriptives for the world and the sample are compared. Table 1 shows that
they hardly dier.18
Table 1: Summary statistics, world and sample
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
inst world 212 5.01 1.81 0.81 8.69
sample 64 4.54 1.65 1.19 8.52
ANS world 150 0.05 0.17 -1.06 0.42
sample 62 0.04 0.15 -0.70 0.36
Additionally, OLS coecients are calculated according to equation 1 for the
world and for the sample. Table 2 shows that these estimates also dier
very little. Therefore, it can be concluded that the sample can be reduced
to 62 countries.
18Tests on the equality of means and QQ-Plots can be found in the appendix (tables 6
& 7 and gure 3.
8Table 2: OLS estimation, world and sample
N Coecient (Std. Err.) F R2
world 150 0.04 (0.01) 34.09 0.19
sample 62 0.04 (0.01) 13.01 0.18
Signicance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%





Results of the IV regression of institutions on ANS are displayed in table
3. The left part presents the results for the rst stage estimation. It shows
a strong negative relationship between (log) settler mortality and current
institutions (-0.77). 36 percent of the variation in current institutions can
be explained by settler mortality. The F-test is rejected and thus the model
explains a signicant part of all variation. Since the coecient is highly
signicant and negative, low settler mortality can be associated with good
institutions today.19
The corresponding second stage results on the table's right side display the
impact of institutions on sustainability (ANS). The coecient for institu-
tional quality is positive (0.05) and highly signicant. Therefore, since ANS
is measured as a percentage share of GNI, an increase of institutional qual-
ity by one unit would lead to a rise in ANS of 5 percent. Although these
numbers should not be interpreted too strictly due to potential measure-
ment error, the positive eect is fairly strong. Hence it can be argued that
institutional quality has a positive impact on sustainability.
In a second regression, the eect on institutions on net national saving
(NNS) is estimated. This would be the `right' measure for sustainability
19As presented in Acemoglu et al. (2001) for risk of expropriation.
9Table 3: The impact of institutions on sustainability
Stage 1 Stage 2
Variable Coecient Variable Coecient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
logM -0.77 ^ R 0.05
(0.13) (0.02)
Intercept 8.04 Intercept -0.19
(0.64) (0.09)
N 62 N 62
R2 0.36 R2 ..
F (1;60) 33.65 F (1;60) 7.28
Signicance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Stage 1: Dependent variable R: institutional quality, explaining
variable/instrument M: settler mortality
Stage 2: Dependent variable: ANS, explaining variable: ^ R:
(tted) institutional quality
if only physical capital was accounted for. Table 4 presents the results. The
estimated coecient is smaller and weaker (not signicant at the 10 percent
level). From the reduced eect on NNS, one can conclude that the dier-
ence between NNS and ANS must be in
uenced strongly by institutions.
Thus, the impact of institutional quality is especially important for the dif-
ference between the two measures, i.e. for the (dis-)investment in human
capital and natural capital. The decisive element among these is energy de-
pletion.20 Therefore, countries with a high share of energy resources among
their natural capital suer the most from low institutional quality.
In this sense, the data supports the hypothesis that one reason why countries
with a high share of natural resources perform especially poorly in terms of
sustainability may be the quality of their institutions.
20This can be shown using a multiple OLS regression of ANS on all its components
(table 8 in appendix).
10Table 4: The impact of institutions on net national saving
Stage 1 Stage 2
Variable Coecient Variable Coecient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
logM -0.74 ^ R 0.02
(0.14) (0.01)
Intercept 7.91 Intercept 0.02
(0.66) (0.05)
N 60 N 60
R2 0.34 R2 ..
F (1;58) 29.66 F (1;58) 2.38
Signicance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Stage 1: Dependent variable R: institutional quality, explaining
variable/instrument M: settler mortality
Stage 2: Dependent variable: Net National Saving (NNS), explaining
variable: ^ R:(tted) institutional quality
2.4 Checks
This section brie
y presents the results for various robustness checks that
were conducted. Tables and other details of the checks can be found in the
appendix. First, the results are not driven by outliers from the Middle East
and Africa (MENA) region, which has particularly low ANS rates. Second,
the IV regression was also conducted with robust standard errors. The co-
ecient remains signicant at the 1% level and the standard error stays
constant (0.02). Therefore, the more ecient OLS estimator is kept in the
calculation.
Third, results from the Hausman test imply that endogeneity is not as se-
vere as assumed in the motivation and the IV approach is not necessary
for this reason. Nevertheless, the OLS coecients are smaller than the IV
coecients. Since the indices for institutions always re
ect only parts of
11the complex and abstract `true' institutions, and additionally are probably
measured slightly dierent across countries,21 they are likely to be mea-
sured with error. By using settler mortality as an instrument, the problem
of measurement error is avoided. The presence of measurement error in the
explanatory variable (in OLS) biases the estimates towards zero, while the
presence of reverse causality leads to an overestimation via OLS. There-
fore, the smaller estimated coecients in the OLS regression indicate that
the distortions caused by measurement error are bigger than the distortions
rooted in reverse causality. Since both problems are accounted for by using
the IV approach, this justies the use of the instrument.
Fourth, the instrument passes two tests for weak instruments and fth,
potentially omitted factors are controlled for: The assumption that settler
mortality has no direct eect on saving decisions today is crucial for the
instrument to be valid. Therefore, additional variables are added that could
presumably be correlated with both settler mortality and ANS. Since the
inclusion of these variables does not lead to changes in the estimates, it is
unlikely that the inclusion of potentially omitted variables would have an
impact on the estimates.22 Variables supposed to determine savings rates
besides institutions, such as income, cultural factors and health variables
are controlled for. In addition to these potential determinants of traditional
savings, energy depletion is controlled for since it has a strong impact on
ANS rates.
21See methodology in Kaufmann et al. (2008)
22Approach by Albuji, Elder & Teber (2000), taken from Acemoglu et al. (2001)
123 Conclusions
In this paper institutional quality was tested for its impact on sustainability
measured by adjusted net saving (ANS). Instrumenting institutions by set-
tler mortality, a positive and statistically signicant impact of institutions
on ANS was found.
In a second step, this eect was compared to the impact institutions have on
the traditional measure of saving, net national saving. The result is a smaller
and much weaker eect. This dierence rstly reinforces the hypothesis that
the quality of institutions is vital especially for countries with a high share
of natural resources. Secondly, it supports the use of the comprehensive
measure of saving.
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16Figure 1: ANS and (log) settler mortality
(log) settler institutional
mortality quality
ANS world .. 0.43
ANS sample -0.32 0.42
Table 5: Correlations: ANS, (log) settler mortality and institutional quality
17Figure 2: ANS and institutional quality (inst)
Paired t test, institutional quality
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err.
sample 64 4.54 0.21
 64 5.01 0
di 64 -0.47 0.21
Pr(jTj > jtj) = 0:0256
where  is the mean of institutional quality for the world (212
observations). The hypothesis tested is Ho: mean(di) = 0 against Ha:
mean(di) != 0, where mean(di) stands for the mean of the sample minus
the mean of institutional quality for the world
Table 6: Test on the equality of means, institutional quality
18Paired t test, adjusted net saving (ANS)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err.
sample 62 0.039 0.02
 62 0.051 0
di 62 -0.011 0.02
Pr(jTj > jtj) = 0:5636
where  is the mean of ANS for the world (150 observations). The
hypothesis tested is Ho: mean(di) = 0 against Ha: mean(di) != 0,
where mean(di) stands for the mean of the sample minus the mean of
ANS for the world
Table 7: Test on the equality of means, adjusted net saving
Figure 3: Quantile-quantile plot adjusted net saving, world and sample
19To check which parts are the driving forces in a country's sustainability
indicator, a multiple OLS regression is conducted. The results have a
purely descriptive quality. It nevertheless provides important insights into
which components are decisive for the behavior of ANS. The set-up implies
that the standardized coecients (beta) re
ect the magnitude of the
economic impact of the respective component. By construction (ANS
equals the sum of its parts), the model explains nearly all variation in the
data (p-value for F-test= 0.00, R2= 0.99). The t-test is rejected on the 1%
level for every component. Energy depletion has the biggest in
uence on
the indicator (-1.02).
GNS CFC EDE NFD END MID CO2
beta 0.57 -0.22 0.11 -0.08 -1.02 -0.13 -0.41
(std err) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.01) (0.05) (0.14)
Estimated equation: ANSi =  + 1GNS + 2CFC + 3EDE
+4END + 5NFD + 6MID + 7CO2 + i
Notation: GNS: Gross national saving, CFC: Consumption of xed capital, EDE:
Education expenditure, END: Energy depletion, NFD: Net forest depletion, MID:
Mineral depletion, CO2: Carbon dioxide pollution, beta: standardized beta
coecients
Table 8: OLS regression, ANS on its components
Indicator coecient
(std err)








Rule of law 0.05***
(0.02)
Control of corruption 0.04**
(0.02)
Stage 1: Dependent variable R: institutional quality, explaining
variable/instrument M: settler mortality
Stage 2: Dependent variable: ANS, explaining variable: ^ R:
(tted) institutional quality
Table 9: IV regression, all indicators separately
204.1 Checks of the IV regression
Outliers To make sure the results are not driven by outliers from the
Middle East and Africa (MENA) region, which (has) particularly low ANS
rates, the IV regression is conducted without the MENA region. Table 10
shows that the estimates hardly change. Nevertheless, excluding the so-
called Neo-Europes,23 which may be positive outliers regarding institutional
quality, leads to changes in the estimates. For further interpretation, one
should therefore bear in mind that those countries may have too strong an
eect on the sample.
basic IV drop drop with robust
MENA Neo-Europes std errors
coe. inst 0.05*** 0.05** 0.09** 0.05***
(std error) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
coe. intercept -0.19** -0.19* -0.34** -0.19**
(std error) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08)
N 62 58 58 62
F 7.28 6.69 7.20 8.54
Table 10: IV regression, checking for outliers and heteroskedasticity
Heteroskedasticity The IV regression was also conducted with robust
standard erros. The coecient remains signicant at the 1% level and the
standard error stays constant (0.02). Therefore, the more ecient OLS
estimator was used in subsequent calculations.
Endogeneity and Measurement Error Table 11 shows the results of
the Hausman test. The null hypothesis that both OLS and IV estimators
are consistent cannot be rejected. The results imply that endogeneity is not
23Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA
21as severe as assumed in the motivation and the IV approach is not necessary
for this reason.
IV and OLS estimation Hausman test
IV OLS
coecient inst 0.05*** 0.04*** 2(1) 0.47
(std error) (0.13) (0.01) Prob> 2 0.49
Table 11: Endogeneity and measurement error
Nevertheless, the table also shows that the OLS coecients are smaller than
the IV coecients. Since the indices for institutions always re
ect only parts
of the complex and abstract `true' institutions, and are probably measured
slightly dierent by country,24 they are likely to be measured with error.
By using settler mortality as an instrument, the problem of measurement
error ist avoided. The presence of measurement error in the explanatory
variable (in OLS) biases the estimates towards zero, while the presence of
reverse causality leads to an overestimation via OLS. Therefore, the smaller
estimated coecients in the OLS regression indicate that the distortions
caused by measurement error are bigger than the distortions rooted in re-
verse causality. Since both problems are accounted for by using the IV
approach, this supports and justies the use of the instrument.
Validating the Instrument
For the instrument to be valid it has to meet two conditions: First, the
instrument must be suciently correlated with the included endogenous
regressor. Second, the instrument must be distributed independently of
the error process. If these two conditions are fullled, the IV estimator is
consistent and settler mortality can be used as an instrument for institutions.
24See methodology in Kaufmann et al. (2008)
22Weak Instruments When the instrument is only weakly correlated with
the endogenous variable, the IV estimate may be biased towards the OLS.
Additionally, weak estimates may not be consistent and, as a result, the tests
of signicance level would be incorrect in size. To test for weak instruments,
a test derived by Stock & Yogo (2001) was used. It is based on the rst-
stage F-Statistic. The hypothesis that the instrument does not enter the rst
stage regression of the 2SLS, i.e. that the instrument is weak even though
the parameters are identied, can be rejected (F: 33.65, critical value (10%):
16.38). Additionally, the rule of thumb that the F-Statistic should be bigger
than 10 is satised.25
Control for Omitted Factors In this section, potential factors that
might have had an impact on both settler mortality and ANS hare con-
trolled for. The results suggest that some of those factors may invalidate
settler mortality as an instrument for institutions in this context.
The assumption that settler mortality has no direct eect on saving decisions
today is crucial for the instrument to be valid. Therefore, additional vari-
ables are added that could presumably be correlated with both settler mor-
tality and ANS. If the inclusion of these variables does not lead to changes
in the estimates, it is unlikely that the inclusion of potentially omitted vari-
ables would have an impact on the estimates,26 although it can never be
ruled out completely.
Variables that are supposed to determine savings rates besides institutions,
such as income, economic growth and demographic factors27 as well as cul-
25?
26Approach by Albuji, Elder & Teber (2000), taken from Acemoglu et al. (2001)
27Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel & Serv en (2000)
23tural factors28 and health variables are controlled for in the following para-
graph. In addition to these potential determinants of traditional saving,
energy depletion is controlled for since it has a strong impact on ANS rates.
Income Settlers could have been more likely to settle in richer areas and
therefore the income level could have had an eect on institutions instru-
mented by settler mortality. Since the income level is also supposed to aect
ANS, this is a potential threat to the instrument. Acemoglu et al. (2001)
show that although settler mortality had a strong impact on income devel-
opment and economic growth through institutions, settlers were not more
likely to settle in richer areas at that time.29 Therefore, it can be ruled out
that saving and settler mortality are both aected by income/economic
growth, which is what is needed to validate the instrument in our case.
basic leg religion life malaria energy
IV origin exp. risk depl
inst 0.05*** 0.05** 0.06*** 0.01 0.06 0.03**
(std err) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01)
coe.added . -.002 -0.005*** 0.01 0.04 -0.70***
(std err) . (0.04) (0.002) (0.01) (0.12) (0.08)
F 7.28 3.81 6.92 8.78 3.94 72.75
Table 12: Control for potentially omitted factors
Culture As Guiso et al. (2006) propose, cultural aspects may in
uence
saving rates. Furthermore, according to Hayek (1960),30 another expla-
nation for institutional development may be legal origin, so this variable is
controlled for. Since all countries in the sample have either British or French
28Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2006)
29The authors take income as the dependent variable in their approach and rule out
the possibility that settler mortality has a (direct) eect on income other than through
institutions by validating their exclusion restriction.
30cited by Acemoglu et al. (2001)
24legal origin, a dummy for British legal origin is introduced. The results in
table 12 show that the dummy is not signicant and does not change the
estimate. Therefore, legal origin can be ruled out as a source of distor-
tion. A second line of argument based on Weber's theory of Protestant
Ethic pursues that institutional development may be in
uenced by reli-
gious aspects.31 Therefore, the percentage of protestants in 1980 is taken as
a control variable.Column 3 in table 12 shows that this hardly changes the
estimate.
Disease Environment & Health A major concern when taking settler
mortality as a instrument for institutions is that it might mirror the cur-
rent disease environment in the countries with colonial experience, which
may have a direct impact on ANS. This would imply that settler mortality
has an impact on ANS through other channels than institutions and would
therefore invalidate it as an instrument. However, the main diseases causing
death among settlers, and hence the main determinants of settler mortality,
were malaria and yellow fever.32 As Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue, the local
population was to a large extend immune against these two health threats.
This follows from low mortality rates of indigenous adults and rules out the
possiblity of invalidating the instrument in this way.
The disease environment and notably yellow fever and malaria have in
u-
enced settler mortality to a great extend. Nevertheless, it might not have
an in
uence on current saving decisions. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that
the mortality rates in the colonized countries with high malaria risk were
not particularly high, because local people had developed various types of
31Bendix (1977)
32Acemoglu et al. (2001)
25immunities. Controlling for current malaria risk in these countries, i.e. in-
cluding an endogenous variable, changes the estimates (see table 12, column
4&5). While the inclusion of endogenous variables should bias the coe-
cients downwards (as it does for life expectancy), it does not change when
malaria is included. In both cases, the coecient is not signicant at the
10% level. This means that the factors potentially invalidate the instru-
ment.33 Nevertheless, one could argue that while current malaria risk has
an impact on saving decisions, malaria risk at the time of settlement did not
(see above). Unfortunately, it is not possible to test for this here, due to the
lack of data.
Energy Depletion One major force driving ANS rates is energy deple-
tion. A country's endowment with energy resources may also have in
uenced
settlement patterns and could therefore be correlated with settler mortality.
Energy depletion as a share of GNI (averages 1996-2006) is used as a control
variable. This variable is highly endogenous and therefore likely to reduce
the eect of institutions. In the IV regression, energy depletion is highly
signicant and has an economically large impact. But since the estimate for
the institutional impact decreases only slightly (probably due to the endo-
geneity of the control variable) and is still statistically signicant, this does
not invalidate the instrument.
33Figures 5 and 4 show the relationship between ANS and malaria and ANS and life
expectancy respectively.
264.2 Institutions, Life expectancy & Malaria
Figure 4: Life expectancy and ANS
Figure 5: Malaria and ANS
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